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TAX NOTE
A UNIFORM CRITERION TO DETERMINE MARITAL
STATUS FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES
A husband and his first wife entered into a separation and main-
tenance agreement in New York in 1946. In 1952, the husband obtained
an ex parte divorce in Mexico,' and remarried there with a second
ceremony later performed in Connecticut. He returned to New York with
his second wife, and in 1953, the first wife obtained a judgment in New
York2 which invalidated the Mexican divorce decree and declared the
first wife to be his lawful wife. For the years 1953-55 and 1957 the
husband and his second wife had filed joint income tax returns. The
Commissioner disallowed the joint return and issued a deficiency notice.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's position8 and the taxpayers'
petitioned for redetermination of the deficiencies. On review by the
Second Circuit, held, reversed: for federal income tax purposes it is of no
consequence that a divorce is invalidated subsequently by a jurisdiction
other than the one that issued the decree. Estate of Borax v. Commis-
sioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
The Internal Revenue Code does not define the status of husband
and wife for purposes of federal income taxation.' The Code merely
requires the taxpayers in a joint return to be married on the last day of
the taxable year.6 Accordingly, the tax consequences incident to the
marital relationship cannot always be predicted with reasonable certainty.
Where taxable situations arise from the marital relationship entered into
under state law, the nature and rights of the parties under such law are
generally determinative for purposes of federal taxation.7
Rules of local law have been applied in construing the tax law to
define and control the status of the parties in bigamous and putative
marriages,8 common law marriages,9 divorces and interlocutory decrees
1. Although the agreement was made six years prior to the Mexican divorce it was
held to be "incident to such divorce." The term divorce was in reference to the status of
divorce rather than the actual decree of divorce. Newton v. Pedrick, 212 F.2d 357, 361
(2d Cir. 1954).
2. Borax v. Borax, 119 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
3. Ruth Borax, 40 T.C. 1001 (1963),.
4. Prior to the completion of the proceedings in the Tax Court, husband, co-petitioner,
died and his executors were substituted in his stead.
5. Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 913 (1950).
Legal rights and interests of husband and wife are created by state law, and federal revenue
acts merely determine when and how the interests created in that manner shall be subject
to income taxes.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d) (1) (A).
7. Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955).
8. Charles Edward Barr, 10 T.C. 1288 (1948). The Tax Court refused to recognize the
marital status of a taxpayer who innocently married a married woman, even though
discovery of this fact was not made until after the taxable year. Had the taxpayer's putative
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of divorce,' ° and annulments." State law, however, has not been deter-
minative of the marital status where its implementation would be dissonant
with the general purpose of Congress to establish a nationwide scheme
of taxation uniform in its applications and provisions. 2 Thus, a common
law marriage, if valid where entered into, is recognized for tax purposes
even after the parties move to another state where the marriage is not
recognized,'" and alimony payments, even where prohibited by state law,
nevertheless may be deductible for tax purposes.1
4
The general rule on the application of state law works well when it
is clear which state's law would apply. But uncertainty arises when the
state of marital domicile invalidates a foreign decree of divorce.'" In this
situation, the courts have taken inconsistent positions with the result that
wife entered the marriage in good faith, thinking she were free to do so, the court intimated
that it might have considered the case in a different light. "Even if that principle [of good
faith assumption of a putative marriage] be accepted, the record is devoid of any showing
that petitioner's putative wife entered the marriage in good faith . . . we are hence under no
necessity to consider that petitioner has not shown any ground for treating his salary as
community income." Id. at 1291.
9. Rev. Rul. 66, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 60. A common law marriage is recognized for the
purposes of filing a joint return if it is valid in the state in which it was entered.
10. Commissioner v. Eccles, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953) afirming per curiam 19 T.C.
1049. The taxpayer was entitled to file a joint return for the taxable year ending prior to
the final date of an interlocutory divorce decree. The Commissioner acquiesced in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6013-4(a),(2) (1959):
An individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of
separate maintenance shall not be considered as married. However, the mere fact
that spouses have not lived together during the course of the taxable year shall not
prohibit them from making a joint return. A husband and wife who are separated
under an interlocutory decree of divorce retain the relationship of husband and wife
until the decree becomes final. The fact that the taxpayer and his spouse are
divorced or legally separated at any time after the close of the taxable year shall not
deprive them of their right to file a joint return for such taxable year under
section 6013.
In Sullivan v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1958), the fact that both parties filed
appeals from a separation decree before the close of the taxable year involved did not affect
the fact that they were no longer married at the close of the year under Maryland law.
Therefore, a joint return was disallowed. Where an appeal does defer the time when a
divorce becomes effective, a joint return may be filed during this period. Tillinghast v.
Tillinghast, 25 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1928) ; Eiermann v. Modenbach, 198 La. 1062, 5 So. 2d
335 (1941) ; Westphalen v. Westphalen, 115 Neb. 217, 212 N.W. 429 (1927).
11. A decree of "annulment" operates as a divorce where it is effective only from the
time of the decree and where payments in the nature of alimony are required. Lily R.
Reighley, 17 T.C. 344 (1951). Alimony payments for medical care and maintenance under a
New York decree annulling the marriage on the ground of incurable insanity were held
deductible, as being equivalent to payments for divorce. Rev. Rul. 130, 1959-1 Cum. BuLL.
61. See also Reginald B. Parsons, 20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 888 (1951), where deductible pay-
ments were made under an agreement incident to a German annulment for a cause sufficient
to justify a divorce in Illinois.
12. Auerbach Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1954).
13. Rev. Rul. 66, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 60.
14. Tuckie G. Hesse, 7 T.C. 700 (1946).
15. Williams v. North Carolina [II], 325 U.S. 226 (1945). The rendering state's finding
of jurisdiction is not itself entitled to full faith and credit. See, e.g., Colby v. Colby, 78
Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
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taxpayers from different states, with identical foreign divorces, have been
taxed differently."6
The Ninth Circuit faced this problem in Gersten v. Commissioner,7
where a California court had invalidated a Mexican divorce obtained by
the husband five months prior to the finality of a California interlocutory
divorce decree. The court chose to apply the law of the domicile and
denied a joint return by the husband and his second wife, both California
residents. The court held that since the second marriage was not recog-
nized by the state of California, it could not be recognized by the federal
taxing authorities. 8 To the same effect was the holding of the Tax Court
in John J. Untermann,9 which recognized as controlling a New Jersey
court's invalidation of the husband's Mexican divorce and remarriage.
However, the Third Circuit in Feinberg v. Commissioner,2" took a differ-
ent view in recognizing alimony payments made incident to a Florida
divorce which subsequently was invalidated by the marital domicile.2
The court concluded that "the mere fact that the marital domicile of the
parties did not recognize the Florida divorce does not render it a nullity
for Federal income tax purposes."2
In the instant case, the Second Circuit was obviously in conflict with
the Gersten and Untermann decisions.2 By application of the rule of
validation,24 first applied in Feinberg, recognition was given the Mexican
16. An excellent example of this can be seen where identical Mexican divorce decrees
are obtained by New York and New Jersey domiciliaries, both of which are invalidated
by their marital domiciles. For purposes of filing a joint return, however, only the New
York taxpayer's divorce would be recognized, thereby entitling him to file with his second
wife. Compare Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) with John J.
Untermann, 38 T.C. 93 (1962).
17. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959) (remanded on other grounds).
18. Id. at 199. "In no case can the marriage of either of the parties during the life of
the other be valid in California if contracted within one year after the entry of an inter-
locutory decree of divorce." CAL. CIVIm ConE § 61, subd. 1.
19. 38 T.C. 93 (1962). The material facts of this case are identical with Borax; only
the holdings differ.
20. 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
21. However, no determination was made as to the husband's marital status for pur-
poses of filing a joint return with his second wife.
22. Id. at 263.
23. This position was taken again by the Second Circuit in Wondsel v. Commissioner,
350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965), where the decision was premised upon the validation rule
applied in Borax. The unanimous majority felt that acknowledgement of the marital status
of living with the second wife was a better choice than the recognition of a marriage "with
a wife with whom he no longer lives." Id. at 341.
24. The purpose of this rule initially was to give tax recognition to alimony payments
made incident to a foreign divorce decree which was invalidated by the marital domicile.
Validation of these alimony payments was necessary to permit their deduction because
under the pre-1954 Code such payments were deductible only where incident to a (valid)
decree of divorce or legal separation. Payments made under a private written agreement
were not deductible. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1939, § 22(k).
The only limitation on the rule is that the rendering jurisdiction's concept of divorce
1965]
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divorce decree. The court expressly declared that a divorce will be
recognized for federal tax purposes so long as the jurisdiction which
issued the decree has not set it aside.25
The results of Borax are consistent with the Congressional intent to
achieve uniformity in the tax consequences incident to the marital rela-
tionship. The rule of validation gives certainty to the migratory taxpayer
whose foreign26 divorce and remarriage have been invalidated by the
state of his marital domicile. Validation, as employed in the present case,
gives recognition to a status of marriage "under color" of validity."
The rule does, however, present serious problems. Its strict applica-
tion would require recognition of mail-order divorce decrees and those
obtained in Mexican divorce mills even after they had been invalidated by
the marital domicile. This would, in fact, be tantamount to giving a tax
boon to bigamists. In this respect, the rule hardly creates complete
uniformity since, as shown in the two previous examples, necessary
exceptions are already apparent.
Perhaps a federal tax definition of marriage and divorce may be
forthcoming by Congress "to eliminate the uncertain and inconsistent
tax consequences resulting from the many variations in state law."
'2 8
Unfortunately however, the adoption of a uniform nationwide definition
would have the effect of recognizing some taxpayers as husband and wife
for tax purposes who, under state law, are not married. It is suggested
that a better rule, capable of more consistent application that the valida-
tion rule, would recognize the marital status of the migratory spouse as
determined by the law of his domicile.29
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be similar to that contemplated by the tax laws. Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d
666, 672 (2d Cir. 1965).
25. Estate of Daniel Buckley, 37 T.C. 664 (1962). A joint return with the second wife
was disallowed because the husband's Mexican divorce from his first wife was subsequently
set aside by the Mexican court which had issued the divorce.
26. By "foreign" is meant any divorce obtained outside of the marital domicile.
27. See note 25 supra. Contra, note 8 supra. It seems very doubtful that the tax
recognition of a meretricious relationship was within the Congressional intent when the
joint return was created.
28. Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299, 301 (1961). The promotion of certainty and
uniformity was intended by Congress to provide all taxpayers with "a uniform construction
of all these provisions" dealing with the determination of marital status, including those
related to joint returns. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1948). The incongruities
in the instant case may provide sufficient Congressional interest for needed action.
29. In the application of this proposal a choice must be made of the effect to be given
retroactive state decisions which deny the validity of the migratory spouse's foreign divorce. To
give tax consequences to the retroactive state decree would unduly burden the taxpayer.
Therefore, it would appear better to recognize the decree only prospectively. Cf. G.C.M.
25250, 1947-2 Cum. BuLL. 18, 32, permitted deduction for alimony payments made in good
faith incident to a Mexican divorce. Upon advice that the Mexican divorce would not be
recognized in the state of domicile, a lump sum settlement was made and the wife obtained
a Nevada divorce. The alimony payments made for the two years prior to the Nevada
divorce were held deductible.
